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I. Foreign Influence Campaigns are Targeting U.S. Elections 
 
“The Russian government interfered in the 2016 election in sweeping 
and systematic fashion.”1 
 
When Russia sought to influence the 2016 U.S. election, one of its 
principal efforts took the form of a years-long propaganda campaign 
carried out on social media.2 As early as 2014, the Internet Research 
Agency (“IRA”) and its employees operated social media accounts that 
targeted the United States, blending covert intelligence operations and 
overt efforts to execute a Russian messaging strategy emphasizing the 
most divisive political and social issues facing Americans.3 When this 
effort first came to light, it was often innocuously described as 
“meddling.” But as more U.S. entities investigated and shared their 
findings with the American people, this effort to interfere in the focal 
point of our democracy came to be seen for what it was—information 
warfare.  
In the words of the bipartisan U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence: 
In 2016, Russian operatives associated with the St. Petersburg-
based Internet Research Agency (IRA) used social media to 
conduct an information warfare campaign designed to spread 
disinformation and societal division in the United States. . . . 
Masquerading as Americans, these operatives used targeted 
advertisements, intentionally falsified news articles, self-
generated content, and social media platform tools to interact 
with and attempt to deceive tens of millions of social media 
 
1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN 
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: VOLUME I OF II 1 (2019), 
https://go.usa.gov/xmV6R. 
2 Id. at 14. 
3 Id.; OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE (“ODNI”), ASSESSING RUSSIAN 
ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS 2 (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://go.usa.gov/xmVFe; S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 116th CONG., 
REPORT ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 
2016 U.S. ELECTION VOLUME 2 (2019), https://go.usa.gov/xdq3w. 
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users in the United States. This campaign sought to polarize 
Americans on the basis of societal, ideological, and racial 
differences, provoked real world events, and was part of a 
foreign government's covert support of Russia's favored 
candidate in the U.S. presidential election.4 
 
Russia deployed a large-scale troll farm to sow discord generally, but 
also to “undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate 
Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency.”5 
This was not a one-off attack. By January 2017, the U.S. Intelligence 
Community had determined that Russia would apply lessons learned 
from its 2016 influence operation for use in future efforts against the 
United States and its allies.6  
The Russian threat appears to have evolved. One of the Russian groups 
that hacked the Democratic National Committee in 2016 now operates 
through U.S.-based servers and another group appears to have thrown 
Western intelligence off the scent.7 The IRA has adopted encrypted 
communication tools that American intelligence agencies cannot easily 
track, and they are paying Americans for use of their Facebook pages, 
circumventing Facebook’s already-weak efforts to keep foreigners from 
purchasing political ads.8 Attempts to hack voter registries and 
electronic ballots pose threats to the brick-and-mortar voting 
infrastructure of the United States. Dis- and mis-information threaten 
another equally important kind of infrastructure—American citizens’ 
faith in their elections.9 
 
4 Id. at 3 (footnote omitted). 
5 ODNI, supra note 3, at 1. 
6 Id. at 5. 
7 Matthew Rosenberg, Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, ‘Chaos Is the Point’: 
Russian Hackers and Trolls Grow Stealthier in 2020, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2020), 
https://nyti.ms/37UmDgF [https://perma.cc/RE85-AT2C]. 
8 Id.  
9 CAILIN O’CONNOR & JAMES OWEN WEATHERALL, THE MISINFORMATION AGE: 
HOW FALSE BELIEFS SPREAD 147–86 (2019) (explaining how social forces help false 
beliefs spread and cause harm); see also Securing U.S. Election Infrastructure and 
Protecting Political Discourse: Hearing before the Subcomm. on National Security 
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Russia’s propaganda machine corrupted America’s public debate by 
exacerbating and amplifying existing veins of polarization. It squeezed 
as many political pressure points as possible—immigration, LGBTQ 
rights, Black Lives Matter, gun rights10—and reached tens of millions 
of Americans through Facebook and Twitter in ways nobody foresaw.11 
This does not take into account the harder-to-detect spread of 
disinformation or mal-information12 on peer-to-peer networks and 
messaging apps. Moreover, it does not include any other social media 
platforms that are growing in popularity, such as SnapChat, TikTok or 
Instagram.13 When aggregated, the leading social media networks 
represent approximately 3.5 billion social media users worldwide—a 
figure that is sure to grow.14 Roughly two-thirds of U.S. adults use 
Facebook and three-quarters use YouTube, with younger Americans 
 
of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong. (2019) (Testimony of Ellen 
L. Weintraub, Chair, Fed. Election Comm’n), https://go.usa.gov/xf88d. 
10 Mike Isaac & Scott Shane, Facebook’s Russia-Linked Ads Came in Many 
Disguises, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2TlOCSe 
[https://perma.cc/W3YG-PEHE].  
11 In 2017, Facebook estimated that IRA-controlled accounts created content that 
reached at least 29 million U.S. persons. Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. 
Election: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (2017). 
Facebook later estimated that 126 million U.S. users were exposed to political 
content produced by the Russians. O’CONNOR & WEATHERALL, supra note 9, at 169. 
Approximately 1.4 million Twitter users may have been contacted through IRA-
controlled accounts. Update on Twitter’s Review of the 2016 US Election, TWITTER: 
BLOG (Jan. 19, 2018), http://bit.ly/37VNwks [https://perma.cc/GN4A-AKDF].  
12 Some have made a distinction between false information that is propagated to 
inflict some harm (e.g., false news stories) and information based on reality that 
causes harm (e.g., stealing and then leaking embarrassing emails). See, e.g., Claire 
Wardle & Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary 
Framework for Research and Policy Making, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Sept. 27, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2SZpLC0 [https://perma.cc/E93A-W7Q5]. 
13 As of July 2019, Facebook boasted over 2 billion active users, compared to 
Instagram’s (owned by Facebook, Inc.) 1 billion active users, and TikTok’s 500 
million active users. Global Social Media Overview, DATAREPORTAL, 
http://bit.ly/39VU840 [https://perma.cc/5DNY-PCA7].   
14 J. Clement, Most Popular Social Networks Worldwide as of April 2020, Ranked by 
Number of Active Users, STATISTA (Apr. 24, 2020), http://bit.ly/2FFHrMV 
[https://perma.cc/A7MA-HBLY]. 
2020] WEINTRAUB & VALDIVIA 705 
 
 
using a variety of social media platforms on a daily basis.15 The result 
is a larger American audience that is at least as vulnerable to malign 
foreign influence operations as it was four years ago. 
And if the scale and diversity of social media fails to impress, consider 
that in 2016 a third of young Americans pointed to social media as the 
most helpful source of information about the 2016 presidential 
election.16 That was more than their combined reliance on news 
websites and cable TV news.17 This fact has not escaped the attention 
of political advertisers. Digital political ad spending for this election 
year is projected to reach $2.8 billion.18 The fragmentation of the 
public’s sources of information, social media users’ tendency to favor 
information that confirms pre-existing beliefs (i.e., the “echo chamber” 
effect),19 and the proliferation of social media platforms raises the 
possibility of a communications ecosystem that plays into the Russian 
strategy for propagating disinformation, which relies in part on high-
volume and multichannel distribution.20 
Nor is it just Russia that we have to worry about. Last year, seven law 
enforcement and national security agencies issued a Joint Statement on 
Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections, in which they warned: 
Our adversaries want to undermine our democratic institutions, 
influence public sentiment and affect government policies. 
 
15 Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Mar. 1, 2018) https://pewrsr.ch/2sf6dQX [https://perma.cc/YH3Q-YDFM]. 
16 Jeffrey Gottfried, et al., The 2016 Presidential Campaign – a News Event That’s 
Hard to Miss, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 4, 2016), https://pewrsr.ch/36HBbQp 
[https://perma.cc/J52M-MWDZ].  
17  Id.  
18 Alexandra Bruell, Political Ad Spending Will Approach $10 Billion in 2020, New 
Forecast Predicts, WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 4, 2019 6:00 AM), 
https://on.wsj.com/2NkchPh [https://perma.cc/72EL-Q93D]. 
19 Walter Quattrociocchi, Antonio Scala & Cass R. Sunstein, Echo Chambers on 
Facebook 1-2 (June 13, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795110.  
20 Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” 
Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It, RAND CORP. 
(June 20, 2016), http://bit.ly/35J68Tg [https://perma.cc/7U3Z-P3VQ]. 
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Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign malicious actors all will 
seek to interfere in the voting process or influence voter 
perceptions. Adversaries may try to accomplish their goals 
through a variety of means, including social media campaigns, 
directing disinformation operations or conducting disruptive or 
destructive cyber-attacks on state and local infrastructure. 21  
 
All Americans, from the average Facebook user to government 
policymakers, should be concerned about the possibility that we are 
more vulnerable to malign foreign influence operations than we were in 
2016. We all have an interest in combating such influence operations 
launched by foreign adversaries, especially the ongoing efforts to 
disrupt U.S. elections and undermine American democracy. The 
question for U.S. legislators and regulators is: do our government 
agencies have jurisdiction over foreign influence campaigns conducted 
through social media? If so, what can they do about it? 
II. The Law Against Contributions from Foreign Nationals 
 
Determination to prevent foreign electoral influence is woven into the 
legal fabric of the United States. The threat of foreign influence 
animated debate about several sections of the United States 
Constitution, from the requirement that the president be a natural-born 
citizen,22 to the Emoluments clause,23 to the exclusive federal authority 
to enter into treaties,24 to the establishment of the Electoral College,25 to 
the number of members in the House of Representatives.26 The 
Founders recognized the danger posed by foreign governments that 
 
21 Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, and CISA on Ensuring 
Security of 2020 Elections (Nov. 5, 2019), 
https://www.cisa.gov/cisa/news/2019/11/05/joint-statement-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-
and-cisa-ensuring-security-2020; see also Joint Statement From DOS, DOJ, DOD, 
DHS, ODNI, FBI, NSA, AND CISA On Preparations For Super Tuesday (March 02, 
2020), https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/03/02/joint-statement-dos-doj-dod-dhs-odni-
fbi-nsa-and-cisa-preparations-super-tuesday. 
22 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 5. 
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
24 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
25 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
26 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
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would seek to influence this country and built fundamental safeguards 
against that threat. 
That early concern over “foreign force and influence”27 has not 
diminished. In 1938, Congress enacted the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act (“FARA”) to uncover efforts of foreign actors to influence the 
American political process.28  Congress believed that FARA’s 
disclosure requirements would act as a deterrent by bringing out into the 
open the activities of those engaged by foreign entities “to spread 
doctrines alien to our democratic form of government, or propaganda 
for the purpose of influencing American public opinion on a political 
question.”29  In 1942, Congress amended FARA and expressly declared 
that the statute’s “policy and purpose” is “to protect the national 
defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United States by 
requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities 
and other activities for or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign 
political parties, and other foreign principals.”30   
 
The first ban on foreign spending in U.S. politics might be viewed as 
the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution.31  In the campaign finance 
sphere, increasing concern about foreign political spending and a 
concomitant uptick in legislative responses marked the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries. In 1966, Congress passed a law prohibiting foreign 
governments and entities, and their agents, from making contributions 
to candidates seeking office.32 When the Federal Election Campaign Act 
 
27 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay). 
28 Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-583, 52 Stat. 631 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621); see also Viereck v. United States, 
318 U.S. 236, 241 (1943) (“The general purpose of the legislation was to identify 
agents of foreign principals who might engage in subversive acts or in spreading 
foreign propaganda, and to require them to make public record of the nature of their 
employment.”).  
29 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 2 (1937).  
30 Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 56 Stat. 248-49 (1942). 
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United 
States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, 
without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or 
Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”). 
32 See Pub. L. No. 89-486, § 8, 80 Stat. 244, 248–49 (1966). 
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(“FECA”) was amended in 1974, Congress extended the prohibition to 
include all foreign nationals.33 Later, to ensure that foreign nationals 
would not gain access to American politicians through soft-money 
donations to political parties, Congress took another step toward 
eliminating foreign influence from American politics. As part of the 
2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (commonly known as the 
McCain-Feingold law), Congress broadened the foreign national 
prohibition, banning foreign nationals from making political 
expenditures and contributing to political parties.34 
To put the present state of the law succinctly: “it is illegal for any person 
to solicit, accept, or receive anything of value from a foreign national in 
connection with a U.S. election.”35 The law explicitly prohibits foreign 
nationals from making or promising to make political contributions or 
donations, paying for electioneering communications, or making any 
other “expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement in 
connection with any Federal, State, or local election.”36 The broad scope 
of the phrase “anything of value” has been affirmed by courts, which 
have defined it to include “goods and services that have tangible, 
intangible, or even merely perceived benefits, for example: promises, 
information, testimony, conjugal visits, and commercially worthless 
stock.”37 The Federal Election Commission has specifically construed 
 
33 See Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(d), 88 Stat. 1263, 1267 (1974). 
34 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 303, 116 
Stat. 81, 96 (2002). 
35 CHAIR ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, STATEMENT REGARDING 
ILLEGAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS (2019), 
https://go.usa.gov/xy38U; see also 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(2) (2002); Draft 
Interpretive Rule Concerning Prohibited Activities Involving Foreign Nationals, 
FED. ELECTION COMM’N, Agenda Doc. No. 19-41-A (made public on Sept. 26, 
2019), https://go.usa.gov/xphmf. 
36 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(f); see also id. at § 110.20 (b)–(j); 52 U.S.C. § 30121. For the 
definitions of electioneering communications, expenditures, and independent 
expenditures, see 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(f)(3), 30101(9), and 30101(17) (2002). 
37 CHAIR ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, THE LAW OF A ‘THING OF 
VALUE’ (2019), https://go.usa.gov/xphmF (listing tangible and intangible goods and 
services that qualify as contributions). 
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it to encompass such items as opposition research, staff time, polling 
results, and advertising services.38  
The U.S. government’s strong interest in enforcing this broad 
prohibition is spelled out in Bluman v. FEC.39 That case upheld the 
constitutionality of the ban on foreign-national contributions and 
recognized that foreign citizens should play no part in “activities of 
democratic self-government.”40 The Supreme Court summarily 
affirmed then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s reasoning when he concluded 
that “the United States has a compelling interest for purposes of First 
Amendment analysis in limiting the participation of foreign citizens in 
activities of American democratic self-government, and in thereby 
preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process.”41 It is 
noteworthy that the facts of this case involved two individuals residing 
and working in the U.S. who wanted to donate a grand total of $700 and 
the cost of copying some flyers to be handed out in Central Park. Yet 
the Court found the government interest in prohibiting this activity by 
foreign actors to be “compelling.” How much more compelling, then, 
must be our concern about a multimillion dollar election-related 
influence campaign carried out on social media by a foreign nation-state 
adversary. 
That interest animates parts of Robert S. Mueller’s report on Russia’s 
electoral interference and the prosecution of criminal violations of the 
foreign-national political spending ban.42 But enforcing the ban on 
foreign national contributions through criminal prosecution is not 
always feasible,43 and the FEC’s civil enforcement mechanism does not 
 
38 Id.  
39 Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). 
40 Id. at 288. 
41 Id. (writing for a three-judge panel). 
42 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2002); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 14; see also, 
e.g., United States v. Singh, 924 F.3d 1030, 1061 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming 
convictions for violations of § 30121); Sealed Indictment, United States v. Parnas, 
No 19-cr-725 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2019), https://go.usa.gov/xphVH (seeking 
convictions for inter alia alleged violations of § 30121). 
43  Cf. Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, No. 18-cr-32 (D.D.C. 
Feb. 16, 2018) (charging defendants under Title 18 in connection with the IRA’s 
foreign influence campaign, but bringing no charges on campaign-finance 
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seem more likely to achieve the desired deterrent effect on foreign 
governments. Moreover, neither option does much, if anything, to 
mitigate the immediate harmful effects of malign foreign influence 
operations. The social-media platforms have taken some steps to self-
regulate. But the challenge of self-regulation is that different platforms 
may undertake disparate solutions, and those solutions tend not to 
infringe on their core business models or financial incentives. Nor can 
the public be assured that self-regulatory efforts may not lag once the 
spotlight is removed from the platforms’ undertakings. Government has 
a role to play here. 
 
Clearly any government action must be taken with due regard to First 
Amendment concerns. But as the Bluman decision notably observed, 
upholding the constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold law’s 
strengthened foreign national spending ban did not implicate the “great 
debates” over the First Amendment ramifications of campaign finance 
laws. “Rather, this case raise[d] a preliminary and foundational question 
about the definition of the American political community and, in 
particular, the role of foreign citizens in the U.S. electoral process.”44 
The court held that “[a] statute that excludes foreign nationals from 
political spending,” from acts “directly targeted at influencing the 
outcome of an election,” served “the compelling interest of limiting the 
participation of non-Americans in the activities of democratic self-
government” and “preventing foreign influence over the U.S. 
government.”45 A law that does so “readily passes constitutional 
muster.”46  
Moreover, in a recent Supreme Court case, now-Justice Kavanaugh 
asserted for the Court (in another context, but quite unequivocally) that 
“foreign organizations operating abroad have no First Amendment 
rights.”47 If that is true under the facts of that case, of private 
 
violations); see also Bob Bauer, The Failures of the Mueller Report’s Campaign 
Finance Analysis, JUST SECURITY (May 3, 2019), http://bit.ly/36KyZaR.  
44 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 286. 
45 Id. at 289-90. 
46 Id. at 283. 
47 Agency for Intl. Dev. v. Alliance for Open Socy. Intl., Inc., 207 L. Ed. 2d 654, 660 
(2020).  
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organizations with United States affiliates, closely enough allied to U.S. 
interests to be receiving U.S. funding, it cannot be less true of foreign 
governments operating from foreign countries to undermine our 
democracy, or those acting on their behalf. 
III. What Can We Do About It? 
 
Members of Congress have not been bereft of ideas for shoring up the 
laws to detect, deter, or sanction malign foreign influence operations in 
U.S. elections, but actual statutory change has proven elusive. The 
Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines (DETER) 
Act, for example,48 would require an intelligence assessment after every 
election on whether foreign governments or their agents interfered in 
the election and would impose strong sanctions on any who did so. Such 
strong deterrence measures are critically important given that the 
techniques our adversaries use are likely to change over time, and we 
cannot be certain that we will detect them in real time. The Honest Ads 
Act49 goes after disinformation campaigns by subjecting digital 
advertising to the same type of disclosure rules that apply to broadcast 
ads and requiring broadcasters and platforms to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that political ads are not purchased by foreign nationals. The 
Shell Company Abuse Act50 would criminalize the use of corporations 
to hide foreign spending in U.S. elections, a risk that is far from 
hypothetical.51 These are just a few of the dozens of bills that have been 
introduced in Congress since 2016 aimed at addressing the threat of 
foreign interference in U.S. elections. All of the bills described in this 
paragraph have bipartisan support. None have passed into law. 
 
 
48 S. 1060, 116th Cong. (2019), https://go.usa.gov/xf8VT. 
49 S. 1356, 116th Cong. (2019), https://go.usa.gov/xf8VK; HR 2592, 116th Cong. 
(2019), https://go.usa.gov/xf8VR.     
50 S. 2939, 115th Cong. (2018), https://go.usa.gov/xf8Vs.  
51 See, e.g., MUR 7122 (APIC / Right to Rise USA) (FEC enforcement action 
concerning $1.3 million foreign national contribution to super PAC through domestic 
subsidiary of Chinese company): FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CONCILIATION 
AGREEMENT: IN RE RIGHT TO RISE USA (2018), https://go.usa.gov/xf8dJ; FED. 
ELECTION COMM’N, CONCILIATION AGREEMENT: IN RE AMERICAN PACIFIC 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL (2018), https://go.usa.gov/xf8vc. 
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The Federal Election Commission is empowered to issue rules 
necessary to carry out the existing ban on foreign national contributions 
that is part of the FECA.52 Numerous times over the last decade, efforts 
by Democratic FEC commissioners (including one of the authors) to 
launch a rulemaking to staunch potential avenues of foreign spending in 
our elections have been stymied.53 Even a proposal to address political 
spending by domestic corporations wholly owned by foreign 
governments failed to obtain the requisite bipartisan support to 
commence the rulemaking process.54 
 
52 See 52 U.S.C. § 30107(a)(8) (describing the Commission’s rulemaking powers). 
53 See, e.g., Draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Independent Expenditures and 
Electioneering Communications by Corporations and Labor Organizations (Draft A), 
FEC Agenda Document No. 11-02 (Jan. 20, 2011), 
http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2011/mtgdoc_1102.pdf; Cynthia L. Bauerly & Ellen L. 
Weintraub, Draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Independent Expenditures and 
Electioneering Communications by Corporations and Labor Organizations (revised), 
Agenda Document No. 11-33 (June 15, 2011), 
http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2011/mtgdoc_1133.pdf; Ann M. Ravel & Ellen L. 
Weintraub, Petition for Rulemaking, Agenda Document 15-31-B (June 8, 2015), 
https://www.fec.gov/resources/updates/agendas/2015/mtgdoc_15-31-b.pdf (see also 
Notice of Availability and Petition for Rulemaking on Independent Spending by 
Corporations, Labor Organizations, Foreign Nationals, and Certain Political 
Committees (Citizens United) filed by Ann M. Ravel and Ellen L. Weintraub, 
Agenda Document 15-31-A, 
https://www.fec.gov/resources/updates/agendas/2015/mtgdoc_15-31-a.pdf); Ann M. 
Ravel & Ellen L. Weintraub, Motion to Open a Rulemaking in REG 2015-04 in 
Response to Public Comment, Agenda Document No. 15-65-A (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2015/documents/mtgdoc_15-65-a.pdf; Ellen L. 
Weintraub, Proposal to Launch Rulemaking to Ensure that U.S. Political Spending is 
Free from Foreign Influence, FEC Agenda Document 16-40-A (Sept. 9, 2016), 
https://www.fec.gov/resources/updates/agendas/2016/mtgdoc_16-40-a.pdf; Ellen L. 
Weintraub, Revised Proposal to Launch Rulemaking to Ensure that U.S. Political 
Spending is Free from Foreign Influence, FEC Agenda Document 16-49-A (Sept. 28, 
2016), https://www.fec.gov/resources/updates/agendas/2016/mtgdoc_16-49-a.pdf; 
Ellen L. Weintraub, Rulemaking Proposal to Combat Foreign Influence in U.S. 
Elections, Agenda Document No. 18-26-A, (May 17, 2018), 
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/mtgdoc_18-26-a.pdf. 
54 See Minutes of FEC Open Meeting of January 12, 2017, at 7-11, 
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-
content/documents/January_12_2017_Open_Meeting.pdf. 
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Meanwhile, technology companies, left to their own (metaphorical) 
devices to respond to abuses of their platforms, have adopted varying 
and evolving approaches, but have not staved off criticism. Facebook, 
having failed to notice that political ads were being paid for in rubles in 
2016, now requires verification from payors. It has built an ad library 
(although researchers have criticized it as difficult to use). Having 
requested in 2011 that its ads be exempted from FEC disclaimer 
requirements, it now accommodates them.55 Facebook has also added 
information about who is behind its pages and their primary country 
location56 and adopted policies of first labeling and then banning ads 
from state-controlled media that target people in the U.S.57 It has failed, 
however, to appease critics from the civil rights community that its 
platform has been used as a venue for misinformation, hate speech, and 
voter suppression by malign actors both foreign and domestic.58 In late 
2019, Twitter abandoned the field of political advertising, but was 
almost immediately criticized for inconsistent application of its self-
imposed ban.59 
 
55 Compare FEC Advisory Opinion Request 2011-09, 
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2011-09/1174825.pdf, with FEC Advisory 
Opinion 2017-12, https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2017-12/2017-12.pdf. 
56 Guy Rosen, Katie Harbath, Nathaniel Gleicher & Rob Leathern, Helping to 
Protect the 2020 US Elections, FACEBOOK: ABOUT (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/update-on-election-integrity-efforts/. 
57 Nathaniel Gleicher, Labeling State-Controlled Media on Facebook, FACEBOOK: 
ABOUT (June 4, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/06/labeling-state-controlled-
media/. 
58 See, e.g., Shin Inouye, Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit Shows Need for Reforms, 
LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS. (July 8, 2020), 
https://civilrights.org/2020/07/08/facebooks-civil-rights-audit-shows-need-for-
reforms/; Mike Isaac, Facebook’s Decisions Were ‘Setbacks for Civil Rights,’ Audit 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/technology/facebook-civil-rights-audit.html; 
Yaël Eisenstat, How to Combat Voter Suppression, BROOKINGS (June 25, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-to-combat-online-voter-suppression/. 
59 Aaron Holmes, Climate Groups Can’t Run Ads about Global Warming on Twitter, 
But Exxon Can, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 8, 2019, 10:37 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-ads-global-warming-climate-change-exxon-
elizabeth-warren-2019-11. 
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The technology industry should not be left entirely to self-regulation, 
but it must be part of the solution. Addressing sophisticated foreign 
influence campaigns will require ongoing efforts and a multi-
stakeholder approach. These are just a few suggestions. While malign 
foreign actors are spreaders of disinformation, they are not the only 
ones. They have domestic predecessors and copycats. In order to 
address disinformation, the conduct of domestic actors will necessarily 
be implicated in some of these recommendations. 
a. The Foreign National Political Spending Ban 
 
Congress should pass the Honest Ads Act. This would subject online 
ads to the same disclosure regime as broadcast ads, would standardize 
and make mandatory the now voluntary maintenance of digital ad 
libraries, and would require the platforms to take reasonable steps to 
prevent foreign nationals from purchasing online political ads. It would 
also update the FECA’s disclaimer requirements to explicitly address 
online ads, leapfrogging a long-stalled regulatory project that has been 
on the Commission’s agenda since 2011.60 
 
As noted above, the foreign national political spending ban prohibits 
foreign nationals from making disbursements for electioneering 
communications. Electioneering communications are currently defined 
as broadcast, cable, and satellite communications disseminated within 
narrow time windows (within 30 days of the candidate’s primary or 60 
days of the general election) that refer to a clearly identified Federal 
candidate and are targeted to that candidate’s electorate.61 The Honest 
 
60 See CHAIR ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, THE LAW OF 
INTERNET COMMUNICATION DISCLAIMERS (2019), 
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2019-12-18-The-Law-of-
Internet-Communication-Disclaimers.pdf. 
61 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a) (52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)) (“Electioneering communication 
means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that: 1. Refers to a clearly 
identified candidate for Federal office; 2. Is publicly distributed within 60 days 
before a general election for the office sought by the candidate; or within 30 days 
before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party 
that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate, and 
the candidate referenced is seeking the nomination of that political party; and 3. Is 
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Ads Act would extend the definition to include communications “placed 
or promoted for a fee on an online platform.” This would clarify that the 
ban on foreign nationals purchasing election-related advertising 
includes online advertising. It would also put some onus on the 
platforms, who are best positioned to know who is purchasing their ads, 
to adopt procedures to ensure they are not selling political ads to foreign 
nationals. 
 
b. Microtargeting Political Ads 
 
If foreign influence campaigns thrive on the echo chambers created by 
insular social networks, then one avenue of attack is to pop those 
information bubbles. Microtargeting allows advertisers to draw upon 
the vast trove of personal data amassed by the platforms to aim with 
laser-like focus at precisely the targets, and only those targets, who will 
be most susceptible to biased and misleading messages. Because these 
ads are disseminated so narrowly, they avoid the scrutiny of those likely 
to raise contrary points of view and engage in counterspeech. Putting an 
end to the microtargeting of political ads would broaden online 
conversations. It would expand rather than limit the potential for wide-
open, robust political debate. It could thus mitigate some of the worst 
tendencies of unscrupulous online actors, including the propagandists 
behind foreign influence campaigns. By eliminating microtargeting, 
social media platforms would enhance transparency, make 
disinformation more visible, and incentivize discourse that unifies broad 
audiences instead of polarizing narrow ones.62 
 
targeted to the relevant electorate, in the case of a candidate for Senate or the House 
of Representatives.”). 
62 See Ellen L. Weintraub, Don’t Abolish Political Ads on Social Media. Stop 
Microtargeting., WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2019, https://wapo.st/30dDqc7 
[https://perma.cc/98XF-B9XK]; Yaël Eisenstat, I Worked on Political Ads at 
Facebook. They Profit by Manipulating Us, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/11/04/i-worked-political-ads-
facebook-they-profit-by-manipulating-us/ [https://perma.cc/T47F-V8V8]; Peter 
Kafka, Facebook's Political Ad Problem, Explained by an Expert, VOX (Dec. 10, 
2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/10/20996869/facebook-
political-ads-targeting-alex-stamos-interview-open-sourced [https://perma.cc/8PE4-
Z24W]. 
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Twitter has banned all political ads on its platform.63 We view this as a 
step too far. It is concerning when an entire platform is shut off as a 
channel for a type of political communication. Google changed its ad 
policy to disallow targeting based on public voter records or political 
affiliations, or targeted more narrowly than zip code, age, and gender. 
This is still more narrow than we would ideally prefer, but it is an 
important step, given that Google’s digital advertising platform 
accounts for more than 37% of all digital advertising in the United 
States.64 Facebook, however, accounts for 22% of digital spending and 
almost 70% of U.S. adults are on that social network, and as of the 
completion of this article, Facebook was resisting entreaties to end 
microtargeted political ads.65 Facebook plans to introduce a way for its 
users to opt out of political ads, but most users are likely to stick with 
default settings.66 As this article went to press, there were rumors that 
Facebook was considering abandoning all political advertising, but they 
were unconfirmed.67 As noted above with respect to Twitter, we believe 
that political advertising should not be banned from platforms 
altogether, but rather, that the platforms should allow advertising but 
not microtargeting. Two bills have been introduced in Congress that 
would ban microtargeted political ads.68 
c. The Role of Algorithms 
 
 
63 Jack Dorsey (@Jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM), 
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1189634360472829952.  
64 Some concerns remain over whether third parties who purchase ads through 
Google’s Display Network—reaching over 90% of all internet users—may use their 
own targeting tools to reach narrow audiences. 
65 Tony Romm, Isaac Stanley-Becker & Craig Timberg, Facebook Won’t Limit 
Political Ad Targeting or Stop False Claims Under New Ad Rules, WASH. POST (Jan. 
9, 2020, 2:24 PM), https://wapo.st/37Qeqds [https://perma.cc/5LZN-B4BP]. 
66 Id. 
67 Mike Isaac, Facebook Said to Consider Banning Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES (July 
10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/10/technology/facebook-politcal-ads-
ban.html [https://perma.cc/6T6H-2RMC]. 
68 Protecting Democracy from Disinformation Act, H.R. 7012, 116th Cong. (2020); 
Banning Microtargeted Political Ads Act, H.R. 7014, 116th Cong. (2020). 
2020] WEINTRAUB & VALDIVIA 717 
 
 
For all its benefits, eliminating microtargeting for political ads runs the 
risk of ceding more power to the algorithms that determine who sees 
political advertising.69 Facebook’s ad delivery system appears to skew 
ad delivery based on the political leanings of targeted users, which 
factor in the ad delivery optimization algorithms run by the platform.70 
Removing microtargeting tools from the hands of advertisers may be 
ineffective if ad delivery algorithms automatically create the same kind 
of insulated audiences. And creating more diverse audiences 
discourages the kind of social network environment that malign foreign 
operations have exploited. 
The real problem with the platforms’ algorithms is a larger issue than 
how ads are delivered. It goes to how all content is delivered. The 
platforms’ business imperative is to keep people on the platform 
(viewing more ads). The most effective way of doing so, the platforms 
have learned, is to serve up a steady diet of emotionally charged content. 
Enragement is engagement. The outrage machine that is a typical social 
media feed exacerbates divisions and polarization in our society and 
creates fertile ground for disinformation from domestic and foreign 
sources. The platforms have yet to fully acknowledge or grapple with 
the negative aspects of the role they play in our politics and democracies 
around the globe. 
d. Fakes, Manipulated Media, and Bots  
 
Facebook generally allows intentionally misleading political content on 
its platform.71 With the exception of content that promotes voter 
 
69 Muhammad Ali, et al., Ad Delivery Algorithms: The Hidden Arbiters of Political 
Messaging (Dec. 17, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), http://bit.ly/37ZFpU4; see 
also Isaac Stanley-Becker, Facebook’s Ad Tools Subsidize Partisanship, Research 
Shows. And Campaigns May Not Even Know It., WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2019, 8:00 
AM), https://wapo.st/39YXiUR [https://perma.cc/J7BT-9KVF]. 
70 Ali, et al., supra note 69, at 10. 
71 Nick Clegg, Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, FACEBOOK: ABOUT (Sept. 
24, 2019), http://bit.ly/35NKlKb [https://perma.cc/JA6Q-GFZY]; Kate Cox, Political 
Ads Can Lie If They Want, Facebook Confirms, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 10, 2019, 12:55 
PM), http://bit.ly/35NK2z1 [https://perma.cc/VDT2-LBCC]. 
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suppression, Facebook exempts politicians from its third-party fact-
checking program.72 And while Facebook provides an ad library that 
promises to provide greater transparency with regard to the identity of 
the people behind the online ads seen by users,73 it is unrealistic to 
assume that malign foreign influence campaigns will not hide behind 
straw accounts or that the average Facebook user will spend time poring 
through their ad library. Unless social media networks are willing to 
take down disinformation or manipulated media, their users are 
susceptible to deceptive content produced in furtherance of malign 
foreign influence operations. 
Does Facebook delete fake content? Sometimes. A deepfake video that 
does not violate Facebook’s Community Standards but is nevertheless 
rated false by its fact-checkers will not be deleted.74 The distribution of 
that deepfake is slowed, however, and when users see or share it, they 
will be alerted of its falsity. Yet some manipulated media may freely 
flow through the social network. Crudely altered videos manipulated 
with video-editing software and not the product of artificial intelligence 
or machine learning—also known as “shallowfakes” or “cheapfakes”—
are not covered by Facebook’s policy. Take as an example the video of 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi that was slowed to make it appear that she 
was slurring her words. Facebook allows users to view and share that 
cheapfake as if it were the real McCoy. 
We believe, as a matter of good corporate citizenship, that social media 
platforms should remove demonstrably false content, not merely flag it 
or slow its spread. This is one of a very solid set of recommendations 
from Paul Barrett of NYU to combat disinformation.75  We’re not 
talking here about mere spin, but provably false content, such as anti-
 
72 Clegg, supra note 71. 
73 Rob Leathern, Expanded Transparency and More Controls for Political Ads, 
FACEBOOK: ABOUT (Jan. 9, 2020), http://bit.ly/35IwlRE [https://perma.cc/7V3H-
K5BY]. 
74 Monika Bickert, Enforcing Against Manipulated Media, FACEBOOK: ABOUT (Jan. 
6, 2020),  http://bit.ly/2R8FUUV [https://perma.cc/8PA6-LMLC]. 
75 PAUL M. BARRETT, NYU STERN CTR. FOR BUS. & HUM. RTS., TACKLING 
DOMESTIC DISINFORMATION: WHAT THE SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES NEED TO DO 
(2019), http://bit.ly/36MKAXf. 
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vaccination or Pizzagate-style conspiracy theories. The public sphere 
does not benefit from the spread of disinformation. Complaints from the 
platforms that they do not want to be the arbiters of truth fall flat. Like 
it or not, they are already playing that role. They have fact checkers. The 
problem is that fact-checking is deployed inconsistently, both within 
and across platforms.  
 
Decision-making in these areas should not fall to single powerful 
individuals. Mark Zuckerberg is correct that he should not personally be 
the arbiter of truth. What is needed is an industry-wide standards board 
to identify and recommend removal of blatantly false content. This 
board should be comprised of entities across the political spectrum with 
their own stringent and respected fact-checking standards. Facebook’s 
outside oversight board, while stocked with impressive individuals, 
appears to be focused on the other side of the problem, complaints that 
too much material is being taken down. It is important to have such an 
appeals board, but that is a solution to a different problem. 
 
Government actors should focus their efforts on improving disclosure 
requirements. Congress should require the identification and labeling of 
false information and manipulated media. This type of disclosure should 
pass constitutional muster, as a disclosure mechanism analogous to 
those that have previously been upheld as essential to an informed 
electorate.76  
Finally, one problem that government and the private sector should 
work together to address is the prevalence of bots on social networks. 
The platforms have taken some steps to remove inauthentic accounts, 
and that is to be encouraged. We would support legislation to incentivize 
more vigorous action. We do not believe that even a Court that has held 
that corporations have First Amendment rights would extend those 
rights to bots. In any event, it seems a risk worth taking. No one wants 
to get their information from a Russian troll or an inanimate bot. 
e. Public Technologists 
 
 
76 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913-14 (2010). 
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It is not enough to convene panels of experts to discuss policy solutions 
or receive their input sporadically through the comments in 
rulemakings. Government needs to up its game across the board and hire 
more data scientists, technologists, and cybersecurity experts. Having 
in-house experts within federal agencies can mean the difference 
between sensible, impactful policy solutions and doomed-to-fail 
regulation. For its part, the FEC should dedicate personnel to the task of 
studying technological challenges, including the digital infrastructure 
that social media networks have created and that foreign adversaries 
seek to abuse. Obviously, the FEC already has a sophisticated IT 
department, whose job it is to secure the FEC’s confidential information 
and maintain its vast public database. What we need – and what we 
believe all government agencies would benefit from – are dedicated 
technologists to increase our capacity to innovate and adopt smart 
technology policies. Moreover, we view it as a weakness that no one at 
the FEC currently holds a security clearance. We believe the U.S. 
government’s response to malign foreign influence operations should 
include the FEC, and that commissioners and senior managers should 
be able to receive relevant briefings from the Intelligence Community.77 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Malign foreign influence operations represent a grave and ongoing 
threat to American democracy. It is tempting, where political speech and 
complicated technology is involved, to take a laissez-faire approach and 
hope that all ends well. The risk, however, is too great that Americans 
will end up with political debates that they cannot trust, elections that 
are robbed of their legitimacy, and policies that are covertly 
manipulated by foreign interference. Government policymakers in both 
the legislative and executive branches owe a duty to the American 
people to grapple with the technical and legal challenges that arise when 
foreign influence campaigns spread on social media. Failure to do so 
 
77 At least one bill has been introduced in the Senate that would synchronize 
intelligence efforts regarding foreign influence operations and coordinate policies 
and responses with relevant federal departments and agencies. See Combating 
Foreign Influence Act of 2019, S. 2493, 116th Cong. § 119C (2019), 
https://go.usa.gov/xphFs [https://perma.cc/PEW4-9ZJW]. 
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could mean surrendering to foreign efforts to exacerbate division and 
polarization and subvert both democracy and truth, straining our 
common bonds and sabotaging our efforts to come together to solve the 
serious problems we face. 
 
 
